blockchain-security

Blockchain Security

Quick Start

1. Download and decompile contracts (source or bytecode)
2. Map storage layout and identify privileged operations
3. Check for delegatecall, CREATE address prediction, reentrancy, access control
4. Deploy exploit contracts via web3.py or cast/forge
5. Verify win condition (isSolved/flag endpoint)

Blockchain CTF Challenge Pattern

# Get connection info
curl http://$HOST:$PORT/connection_info  # -> PrivateKey, Address, TargetAddress, setupAddress
# RPC endpoint
RPC_URL="http://$HOST:$PORT/rpc"
# Win condition: Setup.isSolved() must return true

Key Attack Vectors

1. Delegatecall Storage Manipulation

When contract A does delegatecall to contract B, B's code runs with A's storage.

• Deploy exploit contract that mirrors A's storage layout
• Exploit contract writes to A's storage slots via delegatecall
• Critical: Storage layout must match exactly (same slot ordering)
• See reference/delegatecall-attacks.md

2. CREATE Address Prediction (Nonce Manipulation)

Contract addresses from CREATE are deterministic: keccak256(rlp([sender, nonce]))[12:]

• Brute-force nonce to find which nonce produces target address
• Send dummy transactions (self-transfers) to increment nonce
• Deploy exploit contract at the exact nonce that hits target address
• See reference/create-address-prediction.md

3. Storage Layout & Slot Computation

• Mappings: keccak256(h(key) || uint256(slot_number))
  • Value types: h(k) = abi.encode(k) (left-padded to 32 bytes)
  • String/bytes: h(k) = keccak256(k)
• Read private variables via eth_getStorageAt
• See reference/storage-layout.md

4. Empty Array / Zero-Length Input Bypass

When a function loops over a user-supplied array to validate items (signatures, approvals, votes), passing an empty array skips the loop entirely. If there's no minimum-length check, validation is bypassed.

• Check: for (uint i = 0; i < arr.length; i++) with no require(arr.length >= N)
• Exploit: Call the function with [] to skip all validation

5. ECDSA Signature Malleability

Raw ecrecover accepts both (v, r, s) and (v', r, N-s) (where N = secp256k1 order, v flipped 27↔28). If a contract deduplicates signatures by hash of raw bytes, the malleable form has a different hash but recovers to the same signer.

• Check: ecrecover used without s <= N/2 enforcement (OpenZeppelin's ECDSA.sol enforces this)
• Exploit: Take a known valid signature, compute new_s = N - s, flip v, submit as "new" signature

6. Common Vulnerability Classes

Vulnerability	Check
Reentrancy	External calls before state updates
Access control	Missing onlyOwner / msg.sender checks
Integer overflow	Solidity < 0.8.0 without SafeMath
Delegatecall injection	User-controlled delegatecall target
tx.origin auth	tx.origin instead of msg.sender
Selfdestruct	Force-send ETH, reset contract nonce
Weak randomness	blockhash/timestamp as entropy source
Empty array bypass	Loop validation with no min-length check
Signature malleability	Raw ecrecover without s-normalization

Tools

# web3.py essentials
from web3 import Web3
w3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(RPC_URL))
acct = w3.eth.account.from_key(PRIVATE_KEY)

# Read private storage
w3.eth.get_storage_at(contract_addr, slot)

# Deploy contract
from solcx import compile_source, install_solc
install_solc("0.8.13")
compiled = compile_source(source, output_values=["abi", "bin"], solc_version="0.8.13")

# Send raw bytecode deployment
tx = {'data': bytecode, 'gas': 3000000, 'gasPrice': w3.eth.gas_price, 'nonce': nonce, 'chainId': chain_id}
signed = acct.sign_transaction(tx)
w3.eth.send_raw_transaction(signed.raw_transaction)

Reference

• Delegatecall Attacks
• CREATE Address Prediction
• Storage Layout

Critical Rules

• Always read storage before attacking (private vars are readable on-chain)
• Mirror exact storage layout when exploiting delegatecall
• For CREATE nonce brute-force, check nonces 0-100000+ systematically
• CTF instances are often ephemeral -- script the full attack for speed