From docker-expert
Comprehensive Docker security guidelines and threat mitigation. PROACTIVELY activate for: (1) container security review, (2) running as non-root user, (3) read-only root filesystems and tmpfs mounts, (4) capability dropping (--cap-drop ALL), (5) seccomp and AppArmor profiles, (6) image vulnerability scanning (Docker Scout, Trivy, Grype), (7) supply-chain security (signed images, SBOM, provenance), (8) secrets management (Docker secrets, BuildKit --secret, external vaults), (9) network segmentation (user-defined networks, no --net=host), (10) CIS Docker Benchmark compliance. Provides: hardening checklist, scan-tool integration recipes, CIS benchmark mapping, secret handling patterns, and capability-drop reference.
How this skill is triggered — by the user, by Claude, or both
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/docker-expert:docker-security-guideThe summary Claude sees in its skill listing — used to decide when to auto-load this skill
**MANDATORY: Always Use Backslashes on Windows for File Paths**
MANDATORY: Always Use Backslashes on Windows for File Paths
When using Edit or Write tools on Windows, you MUST use backslashes (\) in file paths, NOT forward slashes (/).
Examples:
D:/repos/project/file.tsxD:\repos\project\file.tsxThis applies to:
NEVER create new documentation files unless explicitly requested by the user.
This skill provides comprehensive security guidelines for Docker across all platforms, covering threats, mitigations, and compliance requirements.
Apply security at multiple layers:
Grant only the minimum permissions necessary:
Threat: Vulnerable or malicious base images
Mitigation:
# Use official images only
FROM node:20.11.0-alpine3.19 # Official, specific version
# NOT
FROM randomuser/node # Unverified source
FROM node:latest # Unpredictable, can break
Verification:
# Verify image source
docker image inspect node:20-alpine | grep -A 5 "Author"
# Enable Docker Content Trust (image signing)
export DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1
docker pull node:20-alpine
Threat: Larger attack surface, more vulnerabilities
Mitigation:
# Prefer minimal distributions
FROM alpine:3.19 # ~7MB
FROM gcr.io/distroless/static # ~2MB
FROM scratch # 0MB (for static binaries)
# vs
FROM ubuntu:22.04 # ~77MB with more packages
Benefits:
Wolfi/Chainguard Images:
Usage:
# Development stage (includes build tools)
FROM cgr.dev/chainguard/node:latest-dev AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY package*.json ./
RUN npm ci --only=production
# Production stage (minimal, zero-CVE goal)
FROM cgr.dev/chainguard/node:latest
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY . .
USER node
ENTRYPOINT ["node", "server.js"]
When to use: Security-critical apps, compliance requirements (SOC2, HIPAA, PCI-DSS), zero-trust environments, supply chain security emphasis.
See docker-best-practices skill for full image comparison table.
Tools:
Process:
# Scan with Docker Scout
docker scout cves IMAGE_NAME
docker scout recommendations IMAGE_NAME
# Scan with Trivy
trivy image IMAGE_NAME
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL IMAGE_NAME
# Scan Dockerfile
trivy config Dockerfile
# Scan for secrets
trivy fs --scanners secret .
CI/CD Integration:
# GitHub Actions example
- name: Scan image
run: |
docker scout cves my-image:${{ github.sha }}
trivy image --exit-code 1 --severity CRITICAL my-image:${{ github.sha }}
Threat: Build tools and secrets in final image
Mitigation:
# Build stage with build tools
FROM golang:1.21 AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY . .
RUN go build -o app
# Final stage - minimal, no build tools
FROM gcr.io/distroless/base-debian11
COPY --from=builder /app/app /
USER nonroot:nonroot
ENTRYPOINT ["/app"]
Benefits:
Complete recipes for build secrets (--mount=type=secret, BuildKit), multi-stage hardening, capability drops (--cap-drop=ALL), seccomp / AppArmor profiles, read-only root, user namespaces, resource limits, and rootless runtime live in references/build-runtime-security.md. Core principles:
--mount=type=secret and --mount=type=ssh; never ARG/ENV for sensitive values.See references/build-runtime-security.md for all commands and recipes.
Threat: Lateral movement between containers
Mitigation:
networks:
frontend:
driver: bridge
backend:
driver: bridge
internal: true # No external access
services:
web:
networks:
- frontend
api:
networks:
- frontend
- backend
database:
networks:
- backend # Isolated from frontend
Threat: Unnecessary network exposure
Mitigation:
# Bind to localhost only
docker run -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 my-image
# NOT (binds to all interfaces)
docker run -p 8080:8080 my-image
In Compose:
services:
app:
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:8080:8080" # Localhost only
# Disable default inter-container communication
# /etc/docker/daemon.json
{
"icc": false
}
Then explicitly allow via networks:
services:
app1:
networks:
- app-network
app2:
networks:
- app-network # Can communicate with app1
networks:
app-network:
driver: bridge
# Create secret
echo "mypassword" | docker secret create db_password -
# Use in service
docker service create \
--name my-service \
--secret db_password \
my-image
# Access in container at /run/secrets/db_password
In stack file:
version: '3.8'
services:
app:
image: my-image
secrets:
- db_password
secrets:
db_password:
external: true
docker inspect)Alternative: Mounted secrets:
docker run -v /secure/secrets:/run/secrets:ro my-image
Automated checking:
# Clone docker-bench-security
git clone https://github.com/docker/docker-bench-security.git
cd docker-bench-security
sudo sh docker-bench-security.sh
# Or run as container
docker run --rm --net host --pid host --userns host \
--cap-add audit_control \
-v /var/lib:/var/lib:ro \
-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro \
-v /usr/lib/systemd:/usr/lib/systemd:ro \
-v /etc:/etc:ro \
docker/docker-bench-security
Host Configuration
Docker Daemon
Docker Files
Container Images
Container Runtime
services:
app:
logging:
driver: "json-file"
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
labels: "service,env"
env: "ENV,VERSION"
Centralized logging:
services:
app:
logging:
driver: "syslog"
options:
syslog-address: "tcp://log-server:514"
tag: "{{.Name}}/{{.ID}}"
Tools:
Monitor for:
# Monitor Docker events
docker events --filter 'type=container' --filter 'event=start'
# Watch specific container
docker events --filter "container=my-container"
# Runtime security with Falco
docker run --rm -it \
--privileged \
-v /var/run/docker.sock:/host/var/run/docker.sock \
-v /dev:/host/dev \
-v /proc:/host/proc:ro \
falcosecurity/falco
User namespace remapping:
// /etc/docker/daemon.json
{
"userns-remap": "default"
}
Benefits: Root in container → unprivileged on host
SELinux:
# Enable SELinux for Docker
setenforce 1
# Run with SELinux labels
docker run --security-opt label=type:svirt_sandbox_file_t my-image
# Volumes with SELinux
docker run -v /host/path:/container/path:z my-image
AppArmor:
# Check AppArmor status
aa-status
# Run with AppArmor profile
docker run --security-opt apparmor=docker-default my-image
Hyper-V isolation:
# More isolated than process isolation
docker run --isolation=hyperv my-image
Windows Defender:
Docker Desktop security:
Image:
latest)Build:
Runtime:
Operations:
❌ NEVER:
--privileged/var/run/docker.sock)latest tag✅ ALWAYS:
This security guide represents current best practices. Security threats evolve constantly—always check the latest Docker security documentation and CVE databases.
Provides CDSS development patterns for drug interaction checking, dose validation, clinical scoring (NEWS2, qSOFA), and alert classification integrated into EMR workflows.
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