By allsmog
Local-first vulnerability confirmation and remediation pipeline for Claude Code: context, x-ray, PASTA threat model, CVE threat-intel, SAST/taint, invariant testing, adversarial hunting, memory exploitability, fuzz proof, rule synthesis, SARIF, and PoC⁺ patch validation behind a hardened policy plane. Operates on source you have on disk, with no hosted service, live target, proxy, or traffic capture.
Authorization-model review. For each endpoint / object-access candidate, determine whether an authorization + ownership check actually protects the action — find missing authz (CWE-862), IDOR / broken object-level authz (CWE-639), privilege escalation, and broken ownership. Assign finding / candidate / rejected with file:line evidence. Read-only — promotes verdicts into .kuzushi/findings.json (source 'authz').
Read-only static triage of compiled binaries (ELF / PE / Mach-O). For each detected binary and its read-only signals (dangerous imported symbols, writable+executable segments, hardening gaps from nm/readelf/objdump), judge whether the signal is a real exposure in context and tie it to source. Assign finding / candidate / rejected with the binary path as evidence. Assessment only — no execution, no exploit-oriented disassembly. Promotes into .kuzushi/findings.json (source 'binary-recon').
Proactive attack-path engine. SEARCHES for ordered entry→…→asset paths where each step is enabled by a finding — composing even sub-threshold (candidate/lead) primitives into a critical chain — using the threat-model assets, the attacker-reachable entry points, and the reachability graph. Also composes already-confirmed findings (precondition → pivot → impact). Does NOT invent findings or change their status; it overlays chains on the findings index.
Deep system-understanding pass BEFORE vulnerability work. Reads the codebase line-by-line where it matters and builds a grounded model — modules, entry points, actors, trust boundaries, data stores, and system invariants — with file:line evidence. Context only: it never finds vulns, proposes fixes, or assigns severity. Writes .kuzushi/deep-context.json.
Crypto-misuse review: non-constant-time comparison of secrets (timing side-channels), missing or compiler-elidable zeroization of secrets, and non-cryptographic RNG used to mint secrets. For each candidate, confirm the value is secret-derived, assess the leak/weakness, and assign finding / candidate / rejected with file:line evidence. Read-only — promotes verdicts into .kuzushi/findings.json (source 'crypto-review').
Measure recall / precision / false-proof rate of the pipeline against a ground-truth manifest. Scores either the bundled planted-vulnerability corpus (regression) or a live run's findings.json against a manifest you supply. Deterministic — no agent, no network. Use to prove a change to the producers helps rather than hurts.
Read-only static triage of compiled binaries (ELF / PE / Mach-O). Detects them by magic bytes, then surfaces dangerous imported symbols, writable+executable segments, and hardening gaps via on-PATH binutils (nm / readelf / objdump). Assessment only — no execution, no exploit-oriented disassembly. Promotes verdicts into .kuzushi/findings.json (source "binary-recon").
Build the heavy semantic indexes the codeql/joern backends query — a CodeQL database (per detected language) and a Joern CPG — under .kuzushi/. Runs asynchronously in the background (doesn't block the session); installs the CLI first if missing. Pass "codeql" or "joern" to build just one.
Proactive attack-path engine. The chain-finder agent SEARCHES for ordered entry→…→asset attack paths where each step is enabled by a finding — composing even sub-threshold (candidate/lead) primitives into a critical chain — using the threat-model assets, attacker-reachable entry points, and the reachability graph. Records each path (ordered narrative + member fingerprints) in .kuzushi/chains.json and attaches a `chains` ref onto each member (status unchanged). Needs ≥2 live findings.
Build a cached code-graph (.kuzushi/code-graph.json) — entry points + per-symbol caller counts (blast-radius / attack-surface signal) — so producers like /diff-review query it instead of re-deriving caller info live. Uses real Joern call edges when a CPG is built, else a deterministic ripgrep heuristic (no heavy tooling required). Re-run after large code changes.
Admin access level
Server config contains admin-level keywords
Executes bash commands
Hook triggers when Bash tool is used
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Modifies files
Hook triggers on file write and edit operations
Modifies files
Hook triggers on file write and edit operations
Uses power tools
Uses Bash, Write, or Edit tools
Uses power tools
Uses Bash, Write, or Edit tools
Security review that proves it or drops it — inside Claude Code.
Most AI security tools cry wolf. kuzushi makes every finding earn its place — it traces the source→sink path, reconstructs the exploit, proves it with a sandboxed PoC, and validates the patch against that exploit — then benchmarks its own recall against planted CVEs so it can tell you what it missed.
.kuzushi/.Point it at source you already have checked out and kuzushi turns security review into a reproducible evidence pipeline: map the code, threat-model it, hunt source-to-sink paths, verify exploitability, build sandboxed proof, synthesize variant rules, and validate patches before they touch your working tree.
kuzushi is built for maintainers and product-security teams who need answers they can ship:
.kuzushi/ with provenance and policy digests./fix validates exploit regression, functional behavior, and supported
semantic oracles in a sandbox copy before apply.It is self-contained Node (no daemon, no hosted service): plain stdio MCP servers, skills, agents, schemas, and a SessionStart hook wire up Tree-sitter, Semgrep, CodeQL, Joern, fuzz harnesses, and language tooling only when the repo needs them.
context ─► x-ray ─► threat-model ─► threat-intel ─► ┌ invariant-test ┐ ─► findings.json ─► verify ─► poc ─► fix ─► report
(langs, (entry (PASTA DFD + (CVEs for └ threat-hunt ┘ (open (exploit- (sandbox- (PoC⁺ (fix-first
deps) points) threats) stack + peers) (adversarial) findings) ability) proven) patch) report)
│
└─► mem-exploitability
(memory-corruption tier
+ mitigation posture)
Each step writes an artifact under .kuzushi/ that the next step consumes. You stay in
control: heavy or outbound steps ask first, and everything runs against your local repo.
This is a local source-code tool with static-first analysis and sandboxed dynamic proof for harnessable targets. How complete that is depends on what you point it at.
Always in scope (any target with source on disk): PASTA threat model, version-checked CVE intel, source→sink taint analysis, adversarial guard-bypass review, static exploitability verdicts, memory-corruption exploitability assessment, and a sandboxed PoC harness.
Web apps / HTTP services — the plugin covers the static half of a grey-box review. Pair it with a dynamic tool (Burp / DAST) for the rest: browsing the live app, mapping observed traffic (endpoints, parameters, cookies, roles) to handlers, and triggering against a running target. None of that lives here.
npx claudepluginhub allsmog/kuzushi-security-plugin --plugin kuzushi-security-pluginAI-powered whitebox penetration testing plugin for Claude Code. 9 languages, 27 skills, 8 autonomous agents. STRIDE threat modeling, hotspot-aware findings, SARIF output, and polyglot monorepo support.
AI-first compliance assessment plugin for Claude Code. Runs prompt-orchestrated ISO 27001 Annex A and NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 assessments with enterprise evidence packs, evidence-backed findings, cold review rounds, and durable run artifacts.
AI-powered PASTA threat modeling plugin for Claude Code. Walks through the 7-stage Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis with STRIDE classification, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, DFD generation, and evidence-anchored threat scenarios.
Complete collection of battle-tested Claude Code configs from an Anthropic hackathon winner - agents, skills, hooks, and rules evolved over 10+ months of intensive daily use
Harness-native ECC operator layer - 67 agents, 271 skills, 92 legacy command shims, reusable hooks, rules, selective install profiles, and production-ready workflows for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, Cursor, and related agent harnesses
Comprehensive skill pack with 66 specialized skills for full-stack developers: 12 language experts (Python, TypeScript, Go, Rust, C++, Swift, Kotlin, C#, PHP, Java, SQL, JavaScript), 10 backend frameworks, 6 frontend/mobile, plus infrastructure, DevOps, security, and testing. Features progressive disclosure architecture for 50% faster loading.
Comprehensive .NET development skills for modern C#, ASP.NET, MAUI, Blazor, Aspire, EF Core, Native AOT, testing, security, performance optimization, CI/CD, and cloud-native applications
Binary reverse engineering, malware analysis, firmware security, and software protection research for authorized security research, CTF competitions, and defensive security
v9.44.1 — Patch release for Gemini environment/version detection and qwen auth gating. Run /octo:setup.