enderphan94

webscanner

A Claude Code plugin that performs automated client-side web security assessments. Point it at any domain and it produces a structured Markdown pentest report covering secrets exposure, vulnerable JS libraries, security misconfigurations, XSS sinks, CORS issues, and more — with zero manual setup required.

What it does

webscanner runs a fixed 6-step security review against the target's browser-facing attack surface:

Step	Check	Tools used
0	OS detection + auto-install deps	pip3, uname
1	Security headers, cookie flags, HTTPS redirect	curl
2	Sensitive path exposure (.env, .git, Swagger, admin panels, etc.)	curl
3	HTML analysis — SRI, tabnapping, CSRF, clickjacking, base tag injection, HTML comment secrets	curl
4	JavaScript analysis — 40+ secret patterns, DOM XSS sinks, prototype pollution, source map exposure	curl, python3
4b	Vulnerable JS library detection via retire.js CVE database	npx retire (requires Node.js)
5	CORS misconfiguration testing	curl
6	Subdomain enumeration + takeover detection via crt.sh	curl, python3

What it detects

Secrets & sensitive data

• AWS / GCP / GitHub / Stripe / Twilio / SendGrid / Slack / Firebase / Sentry API keys
• JWT tokens, private keys, hardcoded passwords, database connection strings
• Internal IPs, staging URLs, source maps, debug artifacts in production JS

Vulnerabilities

• DOM XSS sinks: innerHTML, document.write, eval, location.href, dangerouslySetInnerHTML
• Prototype pollution patterns
• Missing / misconfigured security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, CORP, COOP, etc.)
• Insecure cookie flags (missing Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite)
• CORS misconfiguration (wildcard, origin reflection, credentials + wildcard)
• Subdomain takeover (S3, GitHub Pages, Heroku, Netlify, Azure, Fastly, Cloudfront)
• Exposed sensitive paths: .env, .git/config, /actuator/env, Swagger, GraphQL, phpinfo

Library vulnerabilities

• Known CVEs in jQuery, Bootstrap, lodash, Angular, React, and 1000+ other libraries via the retire.js database

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Requirements

Dependency	Required	Notes
python3	Yes	3.7+
curl	Yes	Pre-installed on macOS and most Linux
pip3	Yes	Ships with Python 3
npx / Node.js	No	Enables Step 4b (retire.js). Without it, library CVE scanning is skipped.

The plugin auto-installs requests, beautifulsoup4, and dnspython on first run via pip3 install --user. If anything is missing it prints the correct install command for your OS (macOS, Ubuntu/Debian, RHEL, Arch).

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Installation

Option A — Load directly (no install, development/personal use):

claude --plugin-dir /path/to/web_scan

Option B — Install from GitHub (persistent, recommended):

/plugin marketplace add enderphan94/web_scan
/plugin install webscan@enderphan94

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Usage

/webscan:scan <target>

The target can be in any of these formats — the plugin normalises it automatically:

/webscan:scan acb.com
/webscan:scan www.acb.com
/webscan:scan https://www.acb.com
/webscan:scan http://staging.acb.com/app

The scan runs all steps and writes a report to client_side_pentest_report.md in your current working directory.

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Example use cases

Bug bounty recon

/webscan:scan target.com

Quickly maps the client-side attack surface before manual testing — surfaces exposed secrets, vulnerable libraries, and misconfigured headers in one pass.

Pre-release security review

/webscan:scan staging.myapp.com

Catch hardcoded API keys, missing security headers, and vulnerable dependencies before shipping to production.

CTF / web challenge

/webscan:scan chall.ctf.example.com

Automates the initial recon phase — checks for exposed .git, source maps, debug endpoints, and JS secrets that are common CTF entry points.

Third-party vendor assessment

/webscan:scan vendor-portal.thirdparty.com

Assess the client-side security posture of a vendor's web portal without needing access to their source code.

Internal audit

/webscan:scan https://intranet.company.internal

Audit internal web apps for the same issues that external attackers would look for.

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Output

The plugin writes client_side_pentest_report.md with:

• Executive summary — severity count table and top 3 findings
• Methodology — OS detected, steps run, tools used
• Asset inventory — subdomains and JS files found
• Findings — grouped CRITICAL → HIGH → MEDIUM → LOW → INFO, each with evidence, reproduction steps, impact, and remediation
• False positives — explicitly called out
• Remediation priorities — ordered by severity
• Appendix — raw evidence, all probed paths and HTTP status codes

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Approximate token usage